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Abstract
Europe is an area with many different jurisdictions. The attempts of the harmonizations of law
have focussed on legislated law, but less on the free movement of legal professionals and on
understanding of how law is being made in the different contituting parts of the European
Union. In this context, it has been suggested to follow the American example and use econo-
mic analysis as a unifying bracket. In particular, law and economics as a subdiscipline of
economics (J.E.L. code K) may provide such a unifying ingredient. The more European
lawyers, atterneys, barristers, procecuters and judges as well as the rule drafting civil servants
think in terms of law and economics concepts, the easier it will be for them to settle their
conflicts, as sharp as those may be in particular cases. 
The German waterpenny case, which not only vindicates the Coase theorem as a conceivable
tenet of legislation, but also deals with a problem recurring in every one of the Member States
of the European Union, provides a good example for showing how this theory driven process
of harmonization of European law could take place without infringing on the 
sovereignty of any one Member State. 
J.E.L. code: K00
Key words: Coase theorem, court decisions under uncertainty
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The German Waterpenny Case: A Paradigm for the Emerging Common
Law of Europe
Sometimes, arcane cases come before high courts and require a specific ruling. The German
waterpenny case i  such an instance. At stake was not just the issue of who ultimately would1
have to bear the costs of using artificial fertilizer that may contaminate ground water. Rather,
in settling this issue the court faced a decision space of uncertainty and had to settle a basic
issue on which, in the future, an entire system of rulings settling liability claims would have to
rely. The decision space was one of uncertainty and not risk because neither the set of concei-2
vable outcomes nor the attributable probabilities can be known beforehand. Moreso. Even the
legal system in which the ruling ultimately would serve as a precedent can no longer be known,
as the German constitutional court just as other highest courts within the European Union now
operates in the context of European harmonization efforts that link the different legal systems
of European Member States - as well as those aspiring to become members - one to another.
There is substantial pressure to allow for a convergence of these legal systems, when by
architecture and in-built procedures they operate according to different rythms. Ultimately,
common features and traits will become apparant, and these will be principles that may not
have guided any single decisions of courts or other rule makers, but they may be able to further
understanding of the decisions and rules as if they had guided them. 
Europe is an area with many different jurisdictions. The attempts of the harmonizations of law
have focussed on legislated law, but less on the free movement of legal professionals and even 
See Hein Kötz, “A Common Private Law for Europe”. In: Bruno de Witte, Caroline3
Forder (eds.), The Common Law of Europe. Deventer: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 31-42.
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less on understanding how law is being made in the different contituting parts of the European
Union. In this context, it has been suggested to follow the American example and use econo-3
mic analysis as a unifying bracket. In particular, law and economics as a subdiscipline of
economics (J.E.L. code K) may provide such a unifying ingredient. The more European
lawyers, atterneys, barristers, procecuters and judges as well as the rule drafting civil servants
think in terms of law and economics concepts, the easier it will be for them to settle their
differences, as sharp as those may be in particular cases. 
The German waterpenny case, which not only vindicates the Coase theorem as a conceivable
tenet of legislation, but also deals with a problem recurring in every one of the Member States
of the European Union, provides a good example for showing how this theory driven process
of harmonization of European law could take place without infringing on the 
sovereignty of any one Member State. 
The paper is a contribution to the literature which looks at the development of law from the
point of view of economic efficiency. There is a large number of studies showing that the
(American) common law moves towards economically efficient solutions. Some authors in the
United States, especially those belonging to the Chicago School, use the wealth maximization
hypothesis not only for the reconstruction and interpretation of past decisions, but also as
guidelines in adjudication. In Europe, scholars have been more reluctant and preferred to
confine the use of the wealth maximization hypothesis strictly to the interpretation of legislated
and case law. However, the Waterpenny Case, which is only one in a string of related cases
3decided by the German constitutional court, clearly shows that the court is willing to assign
economic analysis a larger role also in adjudication perhaps even despite itself. This can have
important implications for the development of a co-herent European law emanating from the
legislation and adjudication of the different Member States.
In this essay, I first give a brief sketch of the Coase theorem as it relates to law and economics
analysis in the context of European legal harmonization. Secondly, the specific case, the
German waterpenny case, is reviewed in detail. The third section covers implications of this
case for future legislation and adjudication. 
I. 
The basic problem underlying the Waterpenny Case is readily stated. Consider farmers who use
artificial fertilizer to enhance the yield of their crop. Some of the fertilizers, not intentionally
but unavoidably, will enter the ground water, a common resource. The water that is pumped
into households and industry, including farms, needs to be prepared according to specificati-
ons. If alien substances occur in the water, they have to be cleansed. Hence, the more fertilizer
is being used on the farms, the more cleansing the water works have to do, and typically the
higher the cost of water preparation is. In this event, we encounter a typical problem of exter-
nalities and should therefore consider the Coase theorem. 
If the costs of transactions can be ignored, the original assignment of property rights will not
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3,4
1960, pp. 1 sequ.
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affect the ultimate allocation of resources, it will however affect the distribution of wealth. In4
the case at hand, if transactions costs can be left out of the equation, it should not matter for
the ultimate use of resources, that is the use of fertilizer, land and implicitly water, who has the
right to the water, the farmer or the water works, the farmer who inadvertantly but unavoida-
bly pollutes the water or the water authorities who have to cleanse the water in order to make
it fit for consumption. The assumption of negligable transactions costs is reasonable in this
case. Transactions costs involve the costs of gathering information, arriving at contractual
agreements and seeing to it that these agreements are lived by. The parties involved, the
farmers and the water works, are well organized and the political process is fit to provide rules
and frameworks that can serve to regulate the use of land and water, all in terms of current
established procedures. Although invariably haggling is going to occur, the marginal political
cost of arriving at a water regulation can be assumed to be quite negligable, at least in compa-
rison to the issues at stake. Hence, the Coase theorem informs us that it should be immaterial
whether the farmers have the right to use fertilizer on their ground at their discretion, even at
the risk of spoiling the ground water, or the water authorities have the right to uneffected
ground water to be conveyed to their customers. 
Of course, as mentioned before, “immaterial” does not mean politically irrelevant, as distributi-
onal issues - not covered by the Coase theorem - may loom large. 
See for instance, the coverage of different editorials in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-5
tung, 17 February 1996, Nr. 41, p. 2. Rarely has the constitutional court been so
harshly criticized in the popular press, with only one recent instance rivaling the
waterpenny commotion as when the court ruled on the seperation of church and state. 
Lothar Späth had been the Prime Minister of the state of Baden Württemberg where6
the water penny was initiated at the behest of economists from the University of
Constance. The Prime Minister had later resigned over a travel funding dispute and
started a new carreer as a promotor of industrial development in the new federal state
of Thuringia.
5
II.
When the waterpenny decision was published, there was an outburst of popular discontent with
the constitutional court. The farmers were said to be dumping their “poison” on the fields, and5
now they were being bribed to impose less harm on the natural resource on water. In the cloak
of the market economy, this political instrument appeared, in violation of the “polluter pays
principle”, “a late victory of Lothar Späth, but defeat of reason”. In th  face of such steamy6
rethoric, it is probably worth considering the case itself. The case had been brought by water
authorities in Baden Württemberg and Hesse against the states of Baden Württemberg and
Hesse (seperately) claiming violation of the Federal constition. For extracting ground water,
water authorities in Baden Württemberg had been charged between one and ten pfennigs per
cubic meter, in Hesse between ten and fifty pfennigs, ultimately one Mark per cubic meter. The
total revenue from these levies amounted to between 145 and 165 million German Marks per
year in Baden Württemberg and between 25 million German Marks and ultimately 160 million
German Marks in Hesse. The authorities claimed violation of articles 2.1 Basic Law (general
guarantee of freedom and personal integrity), 3.1 (equality), 12.1 (freedom of choice of
profession and line of business), 14.1 (guarantee of private property as well procedural violati-
ons). Violation of article 12 had been claimed only by the paper industry, which had joined the
Statement (Leitsatzt) 1.7
6
suit. 
A definitional issue blurs a clear cut analysis of the case. Under German law, there is a differen-
ce between fees charged for specific services rendered by a public institution, special charges
levied for specific purposes, taxes and prices. Roughly speaking, fees require specific services
rendered and in general have to mirror in value the benefit provided or the costs of the provisi-
on. The revenues from charges have to be committed to the specific purpose for which they are
levied, they have to be earmarked. Taxes are levied for the general fund with no specific
offsetting benefit granted, while prices are subject to the forces of supply and demand. Under
this terminology, the states could not levy a tax for lack of competence, the water charges
could not qualify as fees nor prices, nor could they qualify as special charges because the
beneficiaries were not identical to the stated purpose. Most of the argument revolves around
these definitial issues, through which the court cut by stating, that the 
traditional notions and definitions were irrelevant and only the function of the policy instrument
had to be considered in the light of their guarantees and protections provided by the fiscal
constitution. Secondly, the court decided that water as a natural resource was a common7
property, using it created a specific advantage which could be taxed away (Abschöpfen) either
in part or as a whole. 
On several occasions, the court explicitly cites “economists” and  “economics” and even uses
economic jargon, such as “externalities”, “market failure” and functional instruments to “inter-
nalize” external costs. It cites incentive effects of the water penny and legislative discretion
between different functional instruments. Finally, the court emphasizes the care that the
See Francis Bator, “The Anatomy of Market Failure”, Quart rly Journal of Econo-8
mics, 72, 1958, pp. 351-379.
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legislatures have taken in preparing the legislation in Baden Württemberg and Hesse relying on
experts in environmental economics and environmental law and the overwhelming consensus of
these experts in drafting their respective legislation.
The emphasis of the court on economic notions, on the functions of particular instruments and
on legislative due care each need a word of explanation. 
Externalities and Market Failure
With this decision, the constitutional court in Karlsruhe has juxtaposed the economic principles
of neo-classical public finance onto the received doctrine that served to classify public revenu-
es. By buying into modern public finance, which is a dogmatic system by itself, the court has
substituted an old dogmatic system, the old classificatory doctrine of public revenues that had
strong public law underpinings, by the modern theory of public finance as it has emerged
consequent to the development of the theory of market failure. F om the point of view of8
constitutional legal doctrine, this juxtaposition did not require any particular change in me-
thods. One economic system can serve just as well as the other, just as long as there is a
linkage that can translate the economic notions into legal ones. That linkage is provided by the
theory of functions the court has been using for some two decades now in the most diverse
sub-areas of constitutional litigation.
The Theory of Functions
See Peter Senn, “Science as a Source of the Law”, in Jürgen Backhaus The Elgar9
Companion to Law and Economics, Aldershot: Elgar, 1998. (Prior to publication
available from both the author and the editor).
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For many years now, the court has developed the theory of functions (of legal institutions or
legal arrangements) that serves as an entry port of almost any kind of a scientific argument into
its jurisdiction, much as the Brandeis brief does in the United States. Th  court has had ample9
opportunity to test this theory, since the German constitution has been broadly conceived and
can be interpreted and tested as serving to protect many specific institutions. For instance, such
institutions as capital markets, labour markets, collective bargaining and its equilibrating
forces, private property, vested rights of university scholars in their traditional forms of re-
search, corporate forms such as joint stock companies, limited liability companies, limited
liability companies on shares etc., to name just a few are all protected under the constitution in
their basic viability. The doctrine of viability which serves as the standard test that the court
uses in order to judge the constitutionality of particular act of parliament requires that the basic
function of the institution in question not be impaired. A rule passes muster before the consti-
tution if the institution in question, such as a corporation under the co-determination act, to
name just one example, is still viable after application and implementation of the act under
review. In order to determine whether an institution is viable under changed conditions, one
has to first determine what constitutes its viability, i.e. n the notions of the court what is its
function. If, for instance, the function of corporation is held to be that capital owners have a
chance to invest and earn a return on their capital that reflects both the scarcity of capital and
their business acumen, and to give workers a chance to be employed in a particular community,
then these three functions must be possible to be discharged even after any rule has been
imposed and without major impediments in the sense that such impediments cannot be overco-
9me by the kind of management that can be expected to run such a corporation. Likewise, and
to move the discussion closer to the case at hand, a specific public revenue source may be said
to have the function to fulfill the revenue needs of a specific public institution that is dedicated
to a specific need (Anstalt), and then the doctrine has to serve the purpose of protecting both
the institution in terms of its revenue needs and the captive customers of the institution from
overcharging. This is the reason for the dogmatic theory of revenue sources that the court cut
through for the case at hand. It argued, instead, that a Pigouvian tax (the court did not use that
term) is not a revenue seeking instrument of taxation but rather an incentive oriented instru-
ment to seek a particular response on the part of the taxee, and hence it falls outside the
received doctrine. Then the purpose must be to show that the function of effecting those
incentives in the desired manner can well be accomplished by the instrument used and in the
way the instrument is being used. Hence, if the desired purpose is to reduce the reliance on the
natural resource of water by reducing water consumption, and if it can be shown that a water
charge imposed on the water authorities and passed along to the customers serves that purpo-
se, then this specific fiscal instrument can be considered functional and it therefore passes the
constitutional test. 
Yet a popular sentiment insists that the water penny flies in the face of the “polluter pays
principle” and therefore violates the most basic principle of civil law. Of this, the court had to
find an answer in terms of its theory of functions, which it did. Nothing in the theory of Pigou-
vian taxes implies that the charges levied on those whose behaviour imposes externalities on
others have to be benefiting those very inducers of externalities nor need they be used for
otherwise containing harm resulting from the externalities. The revenues from the charges, if
they occur, can be used for any purpose under Pigouvian doctrine. The point of the Pigouvian
See Knut Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1896.10
Modern public choice theory as in the consequence of Buchanan’s work is based on
Wicksell’s Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen.
The assumption by the court is correct. Ronald H. Coase had received the Nobelprize11
in economics about when the litigation started. 
10
levy is to correct for an externality, Pigou cuts through the link layed by Wicksell to always10
consider public outlays and public revenues in one and only one decision. So the court argues
correctly that it is within the discretion of the government to levy the charge, and it is likewise
within the discretion of the government to use the resulting revenue according to its policies.
Even more so, the court argues that if a program can be designed that uses the 
revenues so as to further the policies envisaged, nothing in the test of functionality prevents a
government from pursuing that course. 
It is here where the Coase theorem enters. The “polluter pays principle” does not make the
distinction between allocation and distribution in an economy. The agent who “causes” an
externality is responsible in the sense of being reliable, that is he is responsible for correcting
the allocation of resources as well as the resulting re-distribution of income or wealth. The
Coase theorem, instead, makes the standard distinction in economics that separates issues of
the allocation of resources from issues of income or wealth. In order to achieve this result for
the water penny, that is in order to reject the argument that the consumers who ultimately bear
the burden of the water penny, private households, industrial corporations etc. should also
somehow benefit from the charge intended to reduce water consumption, the court has to
disconnect the allocation part; creating incentives for prudent water use; from the distribution
aspect; who benefits from the revenues of the water penny? Since the Coase theorem is the
vehicle for this argument, the court invoces the consencus among economists and through its11
See Jürgen Backhaus, Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und12
Roeprecht, 1987.
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theory of functions applies the Coase theorem to the water penny case.
By using the theory of functionality as a vehicle to introduce the evidence from social sciences
into jurisprudence and notably the jurisdiction of the constitutional court, the court runs the
risk of using theoretical results that have not been sufficiently corroborated. The results from
social science research are, of course, always subject to the caveat ha  
1. conditions may change and 2. the evidence may simply have been misleading and what
appeared to have been a thorough result, for instance, may rather be the result of spurious
correlations. While some courts in the United States have strongly relied on even recent social
science research results in ordering strong measures, the bussing decisions on the basis of
James Coleman’s research may be one particularly conspictuous example, the German consti-
tutional court has been more circumspective in designing a test with a specific consequence. It
is here where the notion of legislative due care (Sorgfaltspflicht des Gesetzgebers) comes in.
Legislative Due Care
Repeatedly, the German constitutional court has offered this reasoning in upholding controver-
sial legislation. The instance has probably been pioneered when the university constitution act
was challenged, and it has been perfected when the co-determination act of 1976 was under
review. In such instances, when a specific arrangement due to a rule, an act or the composite12
result of different rules, acts, rulings etc. result in a specific clearly circumscribed outcome and
parties claim to be violated in their basic rights, the functional test as described above of the
12
institution in question is being applied. For instance, it could and has been argued that the
water penny makes it impossible for the Hessian paper industry to compete fairly in internatio-
nal paper markets, against foreign competition to supply the big printing locations in Frankfurt.
Against this has to be weighed the concern for water conservation which can, so the functional
argument for the water penny goes, be accomplished by on the one hand discouraging water
use by end consumers and on the other hand discouraging water pollution by farmers through
fertilizers and conceivably pesticides. Yet, what if farmers cannot be discouraged from pollu-
ting ground water, and end consumers cannot be discouraged from using ever increasing
amounts of water, with water authorities being rendered unable to make ends meet and fulfill
their functions? In that case, the court has consistently argued, the factual evidence on which
the decision rested, that has been introduced through the functionality theory, is erroneous; and
consequently, the decision maybe (but also may not be) erroneous as well since, ex f lso
quodlibet! In that case, and if the institution in question can clearly not perform the function
attributed to it by the legislation and the court, it is upon the legislature to correct the act of
parliament. 
This requirement to correct an erroneous act of parliament, to my knowledge is as far as 
constitutional courts go an invention of the judges in Karlsruhe. It is an interesting fruit of the
eternal German Werturteilstreit, the struggle over the meaning of different scholarly methods,
and it is the ultimate corrective on the doors swung wide open to introduce social science
evidence into jurisdiction. Given in requirement of erroneously based acts of parliament to be
subject to review, and given the traditional emphasis on certainty in the law that characterizes
every Western legal system, the court designed a doctrine of due legislative care in order to
safeguard against sudden reversals of jurisdiction and legislation. In addition to considering the
13
constitutionality of a particular arrangement such as an act of parliament, a directive, European
legislation involving German persons (legal or personal), lower court rulings or administrative
rulings, the constitutional court has designed a two pronged procedure to allow social science
evidence into the law. On the one hand, through the theory of functions, most any type of
respectable social science result can enter right into the decisions of the court. This is even the
case for feminist jurisprudence as long as it is scholarly sound. The current president of the
court promotes this course. On the other hand, the court has always insisted, and consistently
does so, that legislatures, when introducing social science evidence into their considerations as
they should, they also should take due care in not glossing over the evidence and being circum-
specting in gathering enough of it. Hence, when in particular far reaching decisions have to be
taken and much evidence has been mounted by either side before the parliament and its com-
mittees, the court raises the standard of legislative care in requiring extensive hearings prior to
the legislation. That is, if any parliament, either one of the sixteen constituant federal states or
the federal parliament itself, wish to pass an act of legislation that can be expected to be
challenged in front of the constitutional court, that parliament now has to engage in an extensi-
ve procedure of fact finding and hearings prior to legislating just in order to make sure that the
act under controversy will survive before the constitutional court, of course always under the
proviso that the evidence does not overwhelmingly change. Hence, by on the one hand lowe-
ring the echelon for admissable evidence and opening the doors for social science research
results, the court at the same time has increased the echelon of evidence on the legislatures by
forcing them to consider and devulge that same social science evidence beforehand. This may
be the wider implication of the functionality theory for German jurisdictions. 
Yet, we also need to consider the implications for Europe. 
14
III.
From a European point of view, the musings of the German constitutional court over the
implications of the provisions of the German Basic Law of 1949 may appear to be rather
immaterial. What is the law in Kehl may not necessarily be the law across the river Rhine in
Strasbourg. Yet, the specific approach taken by the court in interpreting this Basic Law, the
main provisions of which can, by the way, also been found in various European treaties, by far
exceeds the boundaries of the German territories. First of all, legal doctrine is also a scholarly
discipline that is internationally interconnected. The so-called German Rechtskreis also inclu-
des Greece and most of the Central European countries under transition. So, nole s w lens
German legal doctrine enters the doctrine of other European states as well. These states are
members of the Council of Europe, and in that capacity they also influence the process of
European legal harmonization. Others are members of the European Union and in that capacity
they input into the process of European harmonization in law. 
A more important because less obvious element needs to be emphasized. The law in any
country deals with the behaviour of people, and the social sciences have only in the last one
hundred years taken a meteoric rise, while law as a scholarly discipline is several thousand 
years old. This scholarly confrontation has been met in different ways by different legal sys-
tems, but the American system with the Brandeis brief and the German system with the theory
of functionality have been particularly open to social science research. Social science itself is
international, and social scientists are competing internationally, subjecting their research to
international scrutiny as it appears. Hence, social science research is becoming ever more
powerful as an element of the set of data anybody, also a judge, needs to consider. That legal
15
doctrine has a lead that finds a way to systematically integrate social science research into
jurisdiction without compromising the core of the body of the law. With its pioneering decisi-
ons, of which the water penny case is only one, the German constitutional court has shown
how this integration can be accomplished without doing damage to the core of the law. In
doing this, the court, of course, does not export German jurisprudence in the sense of the
specific stipuliations of German legislation, including the Basic Law, into other countries,
undergoing the same process of harmonization; what it exports is the specific method that is at
variance with, for instance, the French method of jurisprudence that is based more stongly into
Latin doctrine and emphasizes specific notions and their interpretations. The dispute over the
classification of taxes is a very good point of illustration, as in that area Germany used to
follow largely French administrative legal doctrine. 
In opening this door to social science, and also providing for the requisite safeguards any high
court needs to maintain when admitting uncontrollable streams of evidence, the court necessa-
rily opted for those social sciences that have the strongest evidence to marshal. At the present
moment, economics is among these sciences, and law and economics is the discipline through
which the results of economic science can be filtered into legal doctrine. Economic science, as
any social science, is, of course, international and as such not bound by specific jurisdictions. In
this sense, active law and economics research that filters into the decisions of high courts in
itself a motor of the harmonization of law to the extent that courts are willing to follow the
exemple of the German constitutional court, as it has been demonstrated in the water penny
case. 
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